DECONSTRUCTING RADICAL OTHERNESS THROUGH EDUCATION. THE ETHICS OF GENOCIDE RECOGNITION AMONG MOROCCAN HIGHER EDUCATION LEARNERS

DECONSTRUIR LA ALTERIDAD RADICAL A TRAVÉS DE LA EDUCACIÓN. LA ÉTICA DEL RECONOCIMIENTO DEL GENOCIDIO ENTRE LOS ESTUDIANTES MARROQUÍES DE ENSEÑANZA SUPERIOR

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Abstract: The Moroccan educational system has inherited the 19th-century axiological spirituality. A synthesis of Islam-oriented morals together with the permanent call for resistance against different colonizers over the last two centuries and the influence of such historical and cultural Genesis is still shaping the strategic choices of values and orientations within the current learnings' modernization. Some paramount cases have become quite classic, namely when learners are called to react ethically to the historical events concerning the Jews destruction during the Second World War. Students are led to express less moral interest neither in learning nor in sympathizing with the victims or the survivors. Thus, moral education practice and orientation are challenged by the students’ inability to develop a neutral stance of moral humanitarian arguments of a universal value. This study exposes the historical Genesis of the Moroccan cultural spiritualism to put across how otherness was structured through traditional institutional moral learning. The lack of authentic humanitarian ethics is due to the hegemony of an institutionalized moral spiritualism at the detriment of empowering moral psychology of multicultural ethics. A pattern of moral imagination is therefore suggested to re-open the humanitarian ethics through genocide reconstruction and ethics.

Keywords: Shoah, ethics, moral unworthiness, morals, education.

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**Resumen:** El sistema educativo marroquí ha heredado la espiritualidad axiológica del siglo XIX. Una síntesis de la moral islámica, junto con el llamamiento permanente a la resistencia contra los diferentes colonizadores durante los dos últimos siglos y la influencia de la génesis histórica y cultural, sigue dando forma a las opciones estratégicas de valores y orientaciones dentro de la modernización actual de la enseñanza. Algunos casos importantes se han convertido en clásicos, como cuando se pide a los alumnos que reaccionen éticamente ante los acontecimientos históricos relativos a la destrucción de los judíos durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Los alumnos manifiestan menos interés moral por aprender y simpatizar con las víctimas y los supervivientes. Así pues, la práctica y la orientación de la educación moral se ven desafíadas por la incapacidad de los alumnos para desarrollar una postura neutral de argumentos morales humanitarios de valor universal. Este estudio expone la Génesis histórica del espiritualismo cultural marroquí para poner de manifiesto cómo se estructuró la alteridad a través del aprendizaje moral institucional tradicional. La falta de una ética humanitaria auténtica se debe a la hegemonía de un espiritualismo moral institucionalizado en detrimento de una psicología moral potenciadora de la ética multicultural. Por lo tanto, se sugiere un modelo de imaginación moral para reabrir la ética humanitaria a través de la reconstrucción y la ética del genocidio.

**Palabras clave:** Shoah, ética, indignidad moral, moral, educación.

1. **INTRODUCTION**

In a melioristic educational system, both religious and modern secular like in Morocco, students are called to assimilate postulations from the Islamic creed as well as worldly recognized principles of humanitarian morality. However, many learning contexts often jeopardize the desired supposed unity of the already antagonistic references within it. Applied ethics perspective could be taken as a remedy to the learner’s consciousness crisis on the issue, and many stages of ethical argumentation abilities on the matter ought to be taken into account. The point is that both international principles of united union and Islamic guidelines of morality are only conceived through abstractly synthesized legitimacy; whereas the ethics of recognition relies more on the accumulation of humanitarian sensitiveness through recognizing the real historical past of mankind and its moral weight on the shared humanistic heritage.

The pedagogical task attributed to teachers is mainly to invent educational answers where conflictual cultural backgrounds of legitimacy are at stake. This study aims at specifying the epistemic and ethical stages of dealings with cases concerning the heated repetitive debates on genocides among teachers
and learners in Moroccan high school institutions. The stagnant aspect of the debate is due to the formal framing of ethical issues neither cultural ethical creed nor rational universal settings of morality could prompt learners to acquire comprehensive practical resolutions in certain well-defined contexts, there are some mediated stages of reasoning that are founded in psycho-hermeneutic applications. If ethical analysis reaches its constitutive elements, new paths of worldly humanistic recognition could be opened; education is meant to invest the horizon of applied humanitarian ethics instead, what are the lines of reconstruction in ethical education that would enable learners to suggest fruitful ethical dealing with the moral demand of genocide recognition?

2. ON SOME CLASSICAL SOURCES OF MORALIZATION IN CURRICULUM

To situate the value of moralizing through education in Morocco one has to review the main recognized sources of ethics along the certain signifying era of culture and society. Not only a content analysis of such sources is needed but also how they were developed alongside the historical process of modernization after the colonial age. The task would be better informed by the meticulous approach to the historical anthropology of learning in Morocco (Gilsenan, 2000, p. 145).

The present section will limit its scope of inquiry to cover only the notional and cultural constituents of moral learning based on the theoretical identification of the key concept’s workings thereupon. Hence, the classically adopted primary schooling comprises Arabic language learning through the Qur’an recitation, since the age of fourth years old pupils are asked to recite the shortest Surat (verset), the traditional learning system never dissociates primary age learning concerning classical Arabic from Qur’ans’ recitation. It is believed that the most effective manner to be acquainted with classical Arabic is to be accustomed to the Qur’an’s well-done expressions and lexicon. Therefore, an assumption is widely spread that the mere exercise of both visual and memory retention of words spelling and phrases’ compounding is quite enough to inveterate the ideal patterned use of language, the mastery of rules, and the authentic sources of eloquence as well (Arkoun, 2009, p. 17).
The classical practice of teaching relies on the repetitive exercise of learning, reciting, and re-spelling during the six primary years to better the pupils’ authentic use of language. The moral is to prepare them for the next stage meant to enable them to explain and justify both Qur’an and the prophet’s teachings about morals and jurisprudence. Then arguing, justifying, and interpreting, as the highest capacities acquired by young learners, are only possible when the language training with Qur’an is fully performed (Jahah, 2015, p. 302).

Along the primary age schooling the universe of the Qur’an’s significance remains the exclusive source of morality. No further didactic means are provided to moralize except the stories told in the holy text, the plenty of former prophets’ biographies and adventures draw the ethical making of Islamic heroism. Accordingly, pupils are enrolled in acquiring language capacities in such a way as to be a posteriori qualified for high knowledge about Islam’s scope here and hereafter. They are subjected during the primary holly text training to the narrative voice of moralization in the Qur’an, where two levels are taken to be deliberately imbricated: the voice of Allah that has moralized the prophets is the same voice that reshapes the young learners’ moral consciousness (Arkoun, 2009, p. 23).

It is assumed behind every story told in the Qur’an to make us aware of God’s main directives in both earth and heaven, regardless of the moralistic metaphysics of the moralizing stories in the Qur’an. The most effective element is the unnoticed pattern of narrative voice which speaks throughout the holy text. It contributes to drawing the first moral landscape of the universe in front of the pupil’s mind. Its effect is far from unimportant since the Qur’an’s pattern of speech correctness is deliberately put in parallel with the existence of the sacred narrative source of moral recommendations. It is much more revealing at the outset to underline the anthropological feature of the twisted voice where it is taken to reshape the way a pedagogical scheme is framed in traditional schooling (Jahah, 2015, p. 304).

The paradigmatic idea behind moralizing within the spirit of the holy text empowers an institutional authority that is inherent to the process of learning. Both the contents and the origin of ethics are articulated to provide the first answer to the metaphysical childish question about the origin of good. To some extent, the voice of Fakih has long invested in the identification made between the voice of Allah and the sacred duties recommended for Muslims on
earth. Such a scheme is taken to provide the explanatory pattern of authority in morals and policy settings; however, the nexus of it could be analyzed in terms of educational relatedness. To argue in favor of the latter idea one has to re-contextualize in anthropological settings how the quality of knowledge about God and projected into the Fakih’s role in the Islamic culture leads to the intended ethical commandment in practice. (Hammoudi, 2010, p. 129).

Both the popular parlance and the institutional edification of religious morality shared the valuation attributed to such complexed articulation in mind between being the holder of God’s authentic speech and being seated into the highest range of religious and cultural morality. Hence, no other sphere could generate the due boundaries of morality since Allah’s speech is by itself the secret from which moral deeds and choices are likely to be enacted on earth (Lahbabi, 1967, p. 59). The traditional system of teaching, being so articulated around the virtues of assimilating holy text verbalism and semantics, contributes hugely to subjugating the pupils’ moral consciousness under the absolute underpinnings of the Islamic foreclosed moral sphere. All deeds, choices, and imagination are invested by the religious-nation integrity in such a way as to make no thinkable value that could be ex-centered to the Qur’anic underpinnings of Goodness. Not only the meta-analysis of moralization through the Qur’an unravels the aspect of limits enclosing the great Ummah’s (Nation’s) whole interest, but the further jurisprudence literature has fostered the notion of religious limits’ morality. The latter notion pretty much served as a hermeneutic device to argue for ethical situations based on versets that indicate sharply the punishments provided in moral contexts of life amidst the historically conditioned life of Ummah (Gilsenan, 2000, p. 52).

Therefore, the very notion of God’s moral limits contributes to the framing of a specie-centered ontological life within the young learners’ moral consciousness. Then, while the curriculum is made to integrate pupils within the spiritual universe of Islamic morality, it forecloses the worldly ethical imagination. The former is made of the chronology of people’s lives based on the teachings offered by former prophets until the Mohammedan message, where alterity is translated into the Islamic historical compromise of conflictual timely ethical divergencies. The whole moral space of events and choices is quietly reduced to the limits of Allah’s formal teachings about old communities and peoples; it is mainly made to justify the moral excellence of the last Ummah
on earth. Moral consciousness has no neighboring sphere of otherness that could enact different new ways of moralization or even moral imagination. (Arkoun, 2009, p. 22).

The modern curriculum of the post-colonial school in Morocco reflects an aspect of new awareness raised in front of the absolutist and foreclosed universe of morality that was instituted along the traditional Qur’anic teaching. Since its political function has been long adopted to empower the nationalist agenda of resistance is over, the new edification of the modern school had foreseen to balance moral learning by introducing systematic references to other cultures. Hence, the invariable syllabus baptized Atarbya Lislamiya (Islamic education) was conceived in such a way as to produce new awareness about the potential themes in Islam which comprise references to universal coexistence, tolerance, and shared ethics. The national schooling aimed at shaping moral teaching through the curriculum to respond to a new era where an urgent need was felt to adjust traditional Islam with various elements in Moroccan culture. The moral was to cope with the cosmopolitan conditions of postcolonial life (As-samadi, 2017, p. 30).

However, the functional turn amidst religious morality teaching in modern schooling has kept the Nation-Centered interest as an invariable horizon of moralization although the strategic modifiers purported the educators to be selective when it comes to empowering the universal openness of the Maliki Islam version. Some chosen enlightening texts from Qur’an and Suna were selected to make the core recommended precept aimed at valorizing the universal call for coexistence which is supposed to be inherent to Islam’s moral message (Lahbabi, 1967, p. 114). Furthermore, a cluster of antecedent moral incidents during the prophet’s life besides the textual Qur’anic appeals are emphasized along the syllabus of primary education to make pupils able to compromise in consciousness the dogmatic chiasm between religious Nation priority and the necessity of coexistence between people from diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. In didactical settings, the case of Moroccan multicultural historical society is always positively evoked to value the potential ability of Islam to unify people with diverse ethnic and cultural sources under its holistic religious spirituality (Gilsenan, 2000 p. 36)

The turning point with the Islamic education syllabus is the fact of being put in line with the new subject of education for citizenship. This is to say,
that the educational legislator has targeted the reshaping of the national value system. Hence, events from national historical memory alongside many highly venerated events are valued and venerated. A quite politicized and moralizing category was targeted: praising the homeland unified entity regardless of the diverse ethnic components of society. Still, the designed consciousness of learners is supposed to compromise the fine dividing line between respect toward the political entity of the national state and the spiritual devotion to the religiously integrated entity of Ummah. At the end of the analysis, values that are vehiculated by the notion of modern State citizenship are deliberately put under the holistic priority of the Religious-Nation spirituality (Gutmann, 2003, p. 505).

The conflated sources of State values and spiritual Nation are partly set this way by the education legislators due to the ideological foundations of the decolonized State. Since the monarchy never conceives its reign without religious illegibility, the later state of the art is most revealing as to how the category of moral worthiness is integrated within the consciousness of learners. Still, a question has to be raised: how the following differentiated sources of morality were balanced within the moral psychology of the learners: the universal civic citizenship, spiritual identity, and the political theology of Ummah? (Lahbabi, 1967, p. 57)

3. World morality claim: adversariness and education

Many studies in anthropology have argued about the non-obvious sense of unity claimed by the religious restoration movements based on authentic Islam in different regions a long history in Morocco, accordingly the study of nineteenth-century religious and cultural dynamics is important when it comes to analyzing the current institutional learning and schooling. The dialectics of the raise and end concerning moral and religious institutions were connected with many socio-ethnic conditions of political and cultural self-identification. Moreover, the pattern crystalized by Zawya has long been an institutional space where identity is taken to be cyclically made. The learning it had claimed relies on an adversary attitude directed against any foreign and threatening cultural intrusion which could jeopardize the spiritual and cultural space of the State.
At the bottom, nineteen century Morocco was politically disposed in such a way to be rather responsive to the virtual cultural and religious oversea interventions coming essentially from Europe. Hence, the scene in ethical life was made in such a way as to empower the claim for seeking a Tarika (method) for an incessant remaking of social morality, while taking into account the scheme of an adversary ontological and political outsider (Jahah, 2015, p. 341).

The post-colonial Moroccan school has sought to redefine its identity by relying more on the nationally spirited contents of moral learning mainly made of the Islamic incitement to protect the nation’s borders as one pillar of the Muslim’s cultural and religious dignity. However, since the establishment of the first post-colonial government, the ministry of national education has integrated a syllabus entitled National Education, where the main turning events along the history of the national resistance are taught within the spirit of glorifying the patriotic sentiments of national pride and belonging. The notion of Jihad (Fighting through life sacrifice) is invested thereupon in an adversary sense (Hammoudi, 2010, p. 100). It is basically defined in patriotic terms, namely as the vehicle of the morally privileged sense of hostility against the colonizers. It is mainly to diagnose at the outset, how the post-colonial syllabuses of both National Education and Islamic Education were put in one perspective by the educational legislators: to empower moralization through schooling.

It seems that the modern school in Morocco has experienced the crisis of a legitimate status concerning the new category of Civic Education as a modern source of social and cultural moralization. Since the post-colonial era, legislators have maintained the old scheme of institutional moralization of individuals. Hence, pupils and students from new generations have come across both an Islamic learning and a national education syllabus where the sharp borders between being a civic agent and being a believer were deliberately put into confusion (Appiah, 2007, p. 259).

It is practically revealing to explore the impacts of such category failure upon educational practices amidst the current Moroccan schooling. Put in other words, the workings of the rival patterns of ethics taught in schools degenerate the claim for formal unity of civic consciousness among Moroccan students along their schooling stages. Furthermore, the relatively recent engagement for moralizing within the spirit of universal Human Rights has made it paramou-
nt to the negative dialectics of religious identity versus cosmopolitan ethics (Gutmann, 2003, p. 505). Some antagonistic attitudes are noticeable among learners who seem unable to endorse the opposed patterns of ethics in practice as well as in terms of self-justification rhetoric. Hence, in upper grades namely collegial and secondary schooling where learners are called to develop their critical argumentation in terms of personal judgments and convictions, the moral consciousness split becomes phenomenal since the syllabus is much more open to cover the contemporary scene of history, literature, and international relations. A three-cornered scheme of argumentation that demonstrates its full hegemony upon the learners' moral narrative. When they are given the floor to express their judgments on historical genocides and crimes against humanity, learners’ discourse is mostly founded on the triangle of identity, adversariness, and moral worthiness. Whatever is the humanistic targeted by the moral learning suggested through the genocide, priority is given to the culturally based criteria of morality and immorality, morality is unnoticeably funded rather on what they believe to be a valid criterion of moral worthiness (Bauer, 72, p. 2015). Therefore, teachers are under the constrain to introduce a cosmopolitan paradigm of moralism, they are mostly led to face the adversary farmwork of cultural belongings, and their culturally biased attitude toward Jewishness orients their intuitive devices of ethics: is it morally signifying to learn about humanism from the historical antecedent of The Jews’ destruction? The lesson of Shoah being debated in philosophy classes or History is already put under the scope of a virtually hostile religious and cultural belonging, the instructors are supposed to come across a lack of moral interest expressed by the learners while receiving knowledge about such historical scenes is mostly colored by doubts, silent judgments of unworthiness or even rejection, regardless to the ideological adopted attitudes, a troubling ethical inaptitude announces itself through the learners' inability to pronounce a humanistic position on the matter (Polak, 2010, p. 53).

The teaching process in ethics almost faces identitarianism as a precondition of judgment about moral worthiness. Therefore, students are inclined to make sense of the current Jewish/Muslim conflict whenever the Jews’ destruction is evoked as genocide and a crime against humanity. Hence, the strategic teaching of morality is deeply marked within such a special context by the workings of an ontological alterity that reshapes the ethical consciousness of learners.
From a pedagogical point of view, teachers should measure to what extent the learners' capacity to sympathize with other sensitive human beings is conducive to a nonidentity-based moral judgment. As long as moral education has no effective strategic didactics to deal with issues, the weakness of civic consciousness among learners will last.

The main obstacle regarding teaching humanitarian ethics in Moroccan classes is to build a reversal teaching model, one which is able to create the pacifist interest of learning from the cosmopolitan historical past. Genocide scenes seem to be revealing since their happenings in history are real incidents among the human behavioral horizon of acting. Students are meant to grasp what are the real drivers of hate behavior in human societies. The question becomes much more ethically interesting when students are exposed to the trouble of human organizational hate behavior made to destroy institutional and social shared life. Teaching ethics must be put in line with drivers of civic education where learners ought to transcend their cultural and religious diversities for the sake of the democratic interest (Eckmann, 2015, p. 59).

With respect to the Moroccan case, young learners express approximately a common matrix of justification as they almost prioritize arguments of “cultural adversariness”. To define the effectiveness of adversary argumentation along moral justification, one has to make room for the alleged unbalanced power relations between Jews and Muslim Arabs during the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whenever the Holocaust or the Shoah are brought to debate, Moroccan learners express their non-interest to recognize the moral worthiness of the Nazi crimes against Jews during World War II. However, the ethical lesson in Modern History, as well as in Moral Philosophy, is meant to target the learners’ emotional ability to sympathize with humankind's hardship whenever and wherever it happens, regardless of the peculiarities of cultural and religious differences. The former context is not external to the nationally spirited learning about civic education, as it could seem at first glance. Nevertheless, the modern turn of democratic education relies on integrating dealing with cultural differences as an acquired capacity learned through public schooling within one’s society. Then, the widespread culturally biased moral justification against the ethical worthiness of the Holocaust among Moroccan higher learners jeopardizes the healthiness and the well-functioning of civic education. It brings the demo-
ocratic legitimacy of the syllabus “Islamic Education” and “Civic Education” into question (Souali, 2010, p. 80).

Moroccan learners come across contents of cosmopolitan ethics during the later stages of learning along two syllabuses of Philosophy and Contemporary History. They, then, experience the subject-matter with a split attitude of both national-Religious belonging and the universal human rights morality. The neglected point by the education legislators seems to be their invalid scope of limiting civic morality to the unique harmonization through shared Islamic values of mutual respect. As a matter of fact, civic learning could never work with an exclusive local and nationalist pattern of moralization. Such strategic assumption is due to the geopolitical urgency to harmonize the local culture with the universal background of human rights. Thus, the full cosmopolitan rhetoric of the latter entered the syllabus at the secondary school learning to make the young students aware of their international surroundings without paying attention to the fundamental learnings about their identity. The self-identification is made of an exclusive national-religious scope. This genesis contributes to keeping the new learning about universal humanism much more abstract than real. This later foundation never intervenes behaviorally with the learners' practical choices in real-world situations. Students are contradictorily ready to show a pragmatic acceptance of the human rights paradigm, but they fail to succeed in a practical enacting of its postulations (As-samadi, 2017, p. 44).

4. SHOAH: A CASE OF EDUCATIONAL APPLIED ETHICS PATTERNING FOR MOROCCAN LEARNERS

The moral importance of teaching Shoah to Moroccan learners could be highlighted through two complementary reasons, the first is openly shared with every international educational context. Thus, the contemporary political and legal conditions of human living are the consequences of many historical drivers behind World War II. Learners worldwide could be convinced of the ultimate value attributed to civic and humanitarian morality and education only when they are accurately introduced to the historical genesis and development of the unprecedented State legitimated ideology of racial supremacy and the
bearings of its action, which had led to Jews mass murder and extermination (Bauer, 2015, p. 71).

To start with the Shoah, as a real historical scene of human community destruction, is heuristically efficient in moral education if only the progress of events in World War II is smartly constructed in a prior way. However, a widespread anachronism to avoid is that we cannot start teaching the Shoah while taking arguments about Human Rights as our starting point because this is simply not true. Once the Holocaust was enacted, it was no longer a matter of denial of human rights. The victims had no rights that could be denied at that moment, killing them was not a denial of rights but a matter of murder. History is meant to show the genesis of human immorality that is barely made of deliberated humanly rationalized and justified choices. If the Shoah ought to be given a place within the contemporary and liberal scope of education, then its epistemic status as knowledge relies on the real history and the timely making of human morality (Eckmann, 2015, p. 56). What humans have really done against humans is the only motivation which had led to the framing of current civic and human rights morality.

Second, the learners’ moral consciousness ought to be reconstructed in such a way as to become ethically responsive to the historical case of Shoah. The term reconstruction is meant to recontextualize (Dewey, 2008, p. 243) in educational terms the protectionist attitude toward the Moroccan Jews expressed by the nationalist royal stance during World War II. The spectacular refusal of King Mohamed 5th to implement the antisemitic Nazi politics of the Vichy government has become part of the cultural morality for Moroccans. Hence teaching the Shoah at both tertiary and higher institutions complements aspects of the historical national perspective about protecting and integrating communities within the diverse components of Moroccan society (Touraine, 2013, p. 30).

However, teachers in tertiary classes and professors lecturing on Shoah always face resistance from their learners. First, they have to justify both the need and the value of learning about the history of Jews’ destruction. Second, many students express either denial or protestation against such learning. They are mostly based on a paradigmatic argument which could be formally termed: an argument against the moral worthiness of the historical facts about Jews’ Destruction. Such an argument needs to be analyzed in a leveled scheme, thus,
the students' reception ought to be first neutralized, a gesture that could be made if only debates with learners are didactically transposed into the ethical ground instead. It is meant, thereby, to argue for moral worthiness while taking the vivid and practical relation of humans to humans as a priority. Thus, it could be shown theoretically that the moral status of judgment could hardly be made while keeping efficient the bearings of ideology, religion, politics, and media depictions. The later dialogue strategy admits that whatever the disciplinary context of learning about Shoah, be it History class, human rights issues, or civic education, a primary neutral stage must be focused on: the moral postulations of humans-to-humans tidiness (Hostetler, 1997, p. 197). Nevertheless, the needed transposition into the human tidiness stage of reflexing is disciplinarily revealing, since the counterpart of neutralizing one’s argument about mass murder is to head the interlocutors' interest toward the primary moral ontology, the one he shares permanently with sensitive and vivid humans. Hence, the Shoah may be well situated within the constructive dialogue of moral learning when teachers succeed to signify it as the extreme moralizing stage of human vulnerability (Bruehl, 1999, p. 289). When instructors on moral learning enact the learners’ disposal to be much more sensitive about the permanent vulnerable life of humans, they enable them to respond rather morally to the extreme stages of real-world vulnerable situation-events on earth. To start moral learning by putting emphasis mainly on moral anthropology is but another source of ethical patterning that revolves rather around the sensitive susceptibility to the Other. By doing so, teachers urge to displace the accent of moral judgment into the lively feelings of being oneself subjected to the tragic susceptibility for murder, extermination, and destruction. The moral behind such displacement is far from being the willingness to introduce Trauma within the process of moral learning; it rather aims to experiment in terms of education to what extent the historical contingent vulnerability to extermination and mass murder could be a real source of civic and moral learning. In its pedagogical outcomes, the neutralizing of an intellectualized identity helps to drive the learners’ consciousness right into an ontological stance where their own relatedness to the other is experienced by means of a bracketed cultured and politicized relationality to the other (Sharon, 2001, p. 72).

“[Bu]t, in its expression, in its mortality, the face before me summons me, calls for me, begs for me, as if the invisible death that must be faced by
the Other, pure otherness, separated, in some way, from any whole, were my business. It is as if that invisible death, ignored by the Other, whom already it concerns by the nakedness of its face, were already 'regarding' me prior to confronting me, and becoming the death that stares me in the face. The other man's death calls me into question, as if, by my possible future indifference, I had become the accomplice of the death to which the other, who cannot see it, is exposed; and as if, even before vowing myself to him, I had to answer for this death of the other, and to accompany the Other in his mortal solitude. The Other becomes my neighbor precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question. Responsibility for the Other, for the naked face of the first individual to come along. A responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not have done to the Other or whatever acts I may or may not have committed, as if I were devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself. Or more exactly, as if I had to answer for the other's death even before being. A guiltless responsibility, whereby I am nonetheless open to an accusation of which no alibi, spatial or temporal, could clear me.” (Levinas, 1989, p. 83).

The problem with a reception in our context is the pathetic way Moroccan young learners manage to posit their self-identity at the center when they come across references to Jews in the curriculum. The epistemic alterity is not only an issue concerning the culturally framed alterity at stake; it exists throughout the process of identifying anything that the learners are called to discover and know, and it is based at the end of analysis on the neutral epistemic strangeness inherent in the gesture of becoming acquainted with the unknowable as such. Levinas has dogged down the pathetic conditions of knowing; he claimed that alterity is at the center of our primary orientation to the unknowable. Theoreticians of epistemic learning are commonly inclined to ignore the ethical virtues of being oriented to something unknowable as an ontological condition of learning; Levinas put more emphasis on such a stage. The approach to knowledge implies first and foremost an ethical relation to difference; that is, what we learn is conditioned upon an initial susceptibility to what is outside of an exterior to us. In this sense, it is the self’s susceptibility to the Other, not knowledge about the Other, to which education must address itself if it is not to inflict violence (Sharon, 2001, p. 67).
The inverted way of prioritizing the ethical response to Others is the turning point in Levinas' outlook; the philosopher attempted to radicalize the effect of difference and alterity upon the self-consciousness of learners, making the pathos of being affected by Otherness much more fundamental than the common way of seeking knowledge as the condition of being related to Others. In terms of pathos, we are more inclined to respond to the ethical appeal created by the unknown in context; hence, before a due stage of cognizance, the recognition has already sown its seeds in the susceptibility to respond or to be responsible towards Others (Levina, 1989, p. 73).

5. The departure case of study

The contemporary mapping of Applied ethics debates provides us with a gradual moral spectrum of many differential notion’s-based cases such as: killing, letting die, and sentimental conspiracy of killing (McMahan, 1994, p. 383). These differences are didactically revealing for exploring moral attitudes towards genocides amidst the new current generations of Moroccan Muslim students in context. As the present study focuses mainly on attitudes in terms of pedagogic situations during moral learning, the case of dealing with moral attitudes by teachers seems to be highly determinant to discover which factors are responsible for foreclosing the moral imagination about issues different human communities (Hostetler, 1997, p. 208).

In the following section, I will introduce a method in terms of a hypothetical-inductive argument based on moral imagination. The point is to deconstruct the counterpart argument usually raised by learners against the moral worthiness of Jews’ Destruction. It has become quite familiar in philosophy classes that teachers deliberately argue for an acceptable universal device of rationalistic morality. This implies a rejection of any cultural, religious, or ethnic consideration as the only valid basis to morally justify one’s action. However, students are mostly inclined to measure modern humanistic and universal moralism in terms of their cultural and religious backgrounds (Gutmann, 2003, p. 503). They show resistance to the formal-deductive rational rule of validating moral actions by balancing the fact of being subject and object of the virtual moral action at the same time.
Among other examples, I have chosen to evoke the case of the Shoah genocides as an antisemitic historical scene of crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi regime during World War II. For many years of professional teaching, I was astonished not by the ideological justification raised against the issue by students, but by the fact that teenagers and students are unwilling to express a humanitarian sensiveness towards the horrors of mass killing and the systematic extermination of human beings, including women, children, and the elderly. The reaction of the majority of students relied mostly on a shared justification that I termed formerly the argument of moral unworthiness, and it was mainly based on the emotive reaction towards the Israeli military violence against the Palestinians.

Given the former case description, the pedagogic focus ought to be put much on the learners’ inability to express noticeable moral solidarity with the historical Jewish victims of genocide and solidarity with survivors. Hence, in terms of an educational agency, a psycho-moral intervention is needed to open wide the virtual quality of ethos sensitiveness in-depth, since learning about an abstracted rule of universal humanism has long proved its ineffectiveness to foster the ethical communicative quality of sympathy among students (Sharon, 2001, p. 73). Not only do pedagogical contexts seem to recommend vividly such communicative quality of ethical solidarity, but also international law theory is likely to be incomplete if it provides no satisfactory means to engage the law system against formal conspiracy with genocide and mass killing. The fact that genocides belong to the historical past of humanity doesn’t disengage educational systems worldwide from revisiting learners’ abilities to develop the sense of sharing humanistic sensitiveness. If the moral behind education practices is to prepare learners for future complex human conditions, then part of its humanizing task is to widen their capacities to build larger human communities.

Among the action plans in such a pedagogical stage, it seems that Applied Ethics has recently made progress. Its diverse methods of inquiring into a new moral dilemma in context have led scholars to explore how empirical criteria are differently applied to make sense of certain moral concepts concerning the significance of Killing, Letting die, and withdrawing aid. Since the empirical criteria determine a way of applying the concepts that we recognize as having moral significance, it seems that the criteria themselves
must have moral significance. We are led to mapping the use of concepts in order to reveal plenty of contours which is inherent to common-sense morality (Norcross, 2003, p. 452). With respect to the learners’ reception of Shoah as a genocide, it makes sense to connect the ethical criteria in cases of killing, letting die, and withdrawing aid to the formerly described moral unworthiness judgment applied to the genocide or even to the denial of it, what if we take the learners adopted the criterion of moral unworthiness as a grade within a measuring spectrum of actions and attitudes that organizes the extend of a concept-system used to attribute moral significance? To reverse the scheme of the moral issue in practical terms, one has to ask the question: what is the behavioral ethical equivalent of the moral unworthiness judgment about the genocide? Throughout this formulation it seems that applied ethics is justified to widen its scope of inquiry, it is tempting to cover under its scope the new generations’ judgments on the past genocides. The concern is far from being only related to the historians’ emphasis on the sense of ethical responsibility towards the past (Barash, 2016, p. 94) it is also revealing when it comes to grasping the circular confluence between believing in certain moral criteria and the behavioral equivalents of it in possible and real-world situations. Many closer diagnostics of the motives behind the genocide have shown that the murder was not by itself the prior aim of the antisemitic attitude; the perpetrators murdered because they were convinced it was the right thing to do, the shared scheme of thinking is due to the nazi ideology which had fostered the consensus around the leader’s nonconditioned true ideas and legitimate intentions, even if a large number of Germans were unable to understand the nexus of such an ideology they kept they kept theirs the strong belief that the leader could do no wrong (Bauer, 2015, p. 69), the Shoah provides us with the pattern that reflects the interaction between certain ways of believing and their behavioral counterparts in terms of moral justification, Thus, ethical learning should better target such a scheme which is instantiated through the real-historical behavioral morality, as a matter of historical fact it belongs to the virtual and possible lines of acting wherever ideology is likely to structure the mass-sphere of moral justification (Rorty, 1990, p. 260).

For a well-trained educator like Dewey, there is no further quintessence of democracy than the ability to widen the borders of one’s ethical community to enable learners to express their solidarity with every individual who
belongs to it. He, thereby, opposed democratic community building to the troublesome effects of strict nationally centered education. Dewey has dealt with moral education as being integrated into the claim of empowering democracy within society. In a turning publication about the homogeneous tasks of democratization and moralization, he gave a definition of ethics that puts the claim for humanitarian solidarity and sympathy at the heart of the method of ethics learning:

“Ethics rightly conceived is the statement of human relationships in actions. In any right study of ethics, the pupil is not studying hard and fixed rules for conduct; he is studying the ways in which men are bound together in the complex relations of their interactions” (Dewey, 2010, p. 39).

In the scope of pragmatic learning adopted by Dewey, the new liberal function attributed to education for democratic progress is not to reach far from the method of science. The only difference is that natural sciences have much done to explore the effectiveness of nature’s laws, making every phenomenon in the universe bound to every other one. However, social sciences have missed their prior function as they have less considered the method of bounding humans together through the efficient education of mankind (Dewey, 2005, p. 47).

In Moroccan classes, the crisis of identity-centered argumentation in ethics traces the limitation of humanitarian sympathy, since the primary grades the syllabus subject-matter is made of definite moral references regardless of the need for progress in terms of psycho-moral ethos. Hence, the desired progress at the level of humanitarian solidarity and sympathizing is left with no method of concrete behavioral improvement. The hypothetic-inductive method of moral imagination relies much on moral psychology to enact the ethical sensitiveness towards the paramount case of Shoah. However, the desired effect is not reachable without focusing, first, on deconstructing the effect of resistance due to the radical otherness which inhabits the cultural and ethnic space of difference between Moroccan learners and the Jewish identity. To achieve this end, the following drawn schemes are meant to dynamize the learners' moral imagination, moving it from a real moral incident with a social spectacular sympathy to a counterfactual and extra-cultural ethical experience with the same desired effect.

This dynamic imaginative humanistic scene is suggested to enact the sentiment of moral sympathy towards a Jewish boy instead, who is facing death.
FIGURE 1.
after being trapped at the bottom of an open well for five days until death. When I suggested the diagram to my students who resisted the recognition of the Holocaust, most of them recognize that they would have expressed the same sympathy toward the Jewish boy and his family regardless of their religious creed.

The intended psycho-pedagogic aim is to inhibit the constructed representations of otherness which play the main role in foreclosing the sentiment of tidiness to the other. Many theoreticians have proven to what extent ethics are made primarily of such fundamental ontological stage of being non-abstractly reflective in our primary response to otherness. Among others, Levinas has shown how the radical distance of otherness is reflectively constructed at the detriment of the brut sentimental ethos that is inherent to the first instants of ethical relationality. Thus, from the fact of being permanently unaware of our self-containment, it doesn’t follow that the fundamental relationship with others must be ontologically disjunctive. The permanent response to others we are currently embedded in means that a non-reflective ethos is already there. This recalls the ontologically conditioned morals of respond-ability, the rather existential way of living in a permanent reaction to the mere existence of others. Such responsive ontology made through the reaction to otherness is the starting point of education too. No justifiable role could be attributed to education more than focusing on the willingness to become spontaneously others (Levinas, 1989, p. 78).

Education is only made possible under such ontological conditions of everybody’s hope to be other than he is. If the latter notion is right then the educational question par excellence is not what education ought to teach in relation to this or that principle but what makes education itself a condition of ethical practice. If we give up asking what to teach in ethics in terms of knowledge and rules, we will give room to another fundamental question on how to make education itself a condition of ethics. In this case, we no longer need to specify the content matter of ethics in education, we shall move in depth instead by arguing for making the ethics of self-change through otherness the only condition of education.

The former hypothetic ethical imagination is not suggested to students in terms of moral knowledge. It is epistemologically counter-intuitive but imaginatively suggestive. It plays the role of experiencing the deconstructed
self-identity through an emotional but non-abstracted self-understanding. The case is a micro-instruction about the constructed cultural self-made possible through schooling in Moroccan classes. The dilemma seems to be far more complex since democratizing by means of educational practices demands fruitful critique on the constructed ethical subjects that are designed under the effect of institutionalized curricula. The liberal virtue of raising educational subjects within the free space of self-making is constantly opposed by institutional cultural politics. However, humanitarian ethics could only be rightly implemented through the openness to ontological change made possible along horizons of emotional responsiveness. Democratic schooling makes room for the reshaping powers of otherness along education, and this is a paradigmatic problem that was rightly prognosticated decades ago by Dewey.

6. Conclusion

The main lost but needed articulation in the Moroccan context of moral learning is to neutralize the moralistic responsiveness to the humanitarian historical past of genocides. This task could be achieved only by skillfully introducing the ethos of responsiveness and responsibility within the pedagogy of moral learning. Since the Shoah enacts plenty of cultural, ideological, and religious aspects of adversariness, the human rights outlook of learning could invest the historical past of Shoah not only as knowledge but also as a source of moral ontology. Instructors need to measure the learners’ emotional openness to know much more than the amount of cognizance achievement. Only when the first aspect is dipped and pedagogically assimilated, new lines of humanistic replies will be suggested by the learners themselves. The pathological clash between humanitarian ethics and the core set of beliefs is shaping the learners’ attitudes towards the Jews’ destruction issue in history. Both their current judgments and denials arise from the centralized cultural self at the detriment of the pathetic element of reply, one which connects humans to humans with no prior constructed representations of otherness.

In terms of moral learning, many surrounding aspects of the Shoah are needed to introduce learners rather into the moral ontology of vulnerability.
The fact that judgments isolate communities and groups is worth mentioning within the context of war and conflicts. Furthermore, morality is revealed as the being rather than the way consensus is ideologically built in such a way as to exterminate other people for the sake of one’s identified group. If ethics is taken to be prior to knowledge in the context of genocide education, then the moral argumentation produced by the perpetrators is the jeopardizing enemy to fight. There seems to be a central hermeneutics on the issue. Since the cultural-self intervenes in the process of moral learning, learners are much more inclined to see what they believe about the Shoah. The role of ethics is to make them able to believe what they see instead.

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